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 after we had made sufficient progress in the Delta so that all concerned began to realize that the Viet Cong were losing the support of the population, and that their ability to continue the war depended solely on North Vietnamese support, I think we should indicate as much privately to the North Vietnamese and follow this by selected attacks on their infiltration bases and training camps.

In my judgment, significant action against North Vietnam that is taken before we have demonstrated success in our counterinsurgency program will be interpreted by the Communists as an act of desperation, and will, therefore, not be effective in persuading the North Vietnamese to cease and desist. What is worse, I think that premature action will so alarm our friends and allies and a significant segment of domestic opinion that the pressures for neutralization will become formidable.

In sum, I believe that we can win in Vietnam with a number of provisos.

The first proviso is that we do not over-militarize the war--that we concentrate not on killing Viet Cong…but on an effective program for extending the areas of security gradually, systematically, and thoroughly…

My second proviso is that there be political stability in Saigon… 50/

Some of the Hilsman recommendations were to be adopted, none rejected out-of-hand. The so-called oil blot principle had many adherents, and was in fact already coming into vogue. Over the ensuing months, the phrase was much honored, though the execution may have faltered. No one disputed the principle that the hamlets needed security above all else, nor that everything depended on a stable government in Saigon. Nevertheless, emphasis shifted toward greater emphasis on military operations, perhaps for the pressing reason that the VC were out now in increasing numbers, with more and better weapons, seeming to invite, if not to require, conventional military operations if the VC threatening the hamlets were to be destroyed or reduced to powerlessness. And, above all, the more elusive the VC were, the stronger they grew, and the more unstable and unpopular the GVN became, the more tempting the idea of attacking the north seemed to be.

Much more influential than these Hilsman views were those of the JCS, especially as set forth in the memorandum of l8 February 1964 to the SecDef from the CJCS: Rh