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 strategic concept calls for primary emphasis on giving security to the villagers. The tactics are the so-called oil-blot approach, starting with a secure area and extending it slowly, making sure no Viet Cong pockets are left behind, and using police units to winkle out [] the Viet Cong agents in each particular village. This calls, for the use of military forces in a different way from that of orthodox, conventional war. Rather than chasing Viet Cong, the military must put primary emphasis on clear-and-hold operations and on rapid reinforcement of villages under attack. It is also important, of course, to keep the Viet Cong regular units off balance by conventional offensive operations, but these should be secondary to the major task of extending security…

At the heart of this strategic concept are two basic principles:

The first is that of the oil blot. In the past the GVN sought to blanket the whole country with so-called strategic hamlets…The result was to blanket the Delta with little Dienbienphus--indefensible, inadequately armed hamlets far from reinforcements…In effect these were storage places of arms for the Viet Cong which could be seized at any time. After November first, the military began to demobilize some of these vulnerable villages…and a race developed between the government and the Viet Cong. The race may have ended in a tie, but…the Viet Cong now have much better weapons and greater stocks of ammunition than they ever had before.

The second basic principle is that the way to fight a guerrilla is to adopt the tactics of a guerrilla…In spite of all our pressures, this has never been done in Vietnam. Instead, the emphasis has been on large operations…

As to the question of operations against North Vietnam, I would suggest that such operations may at a certain stage be a useful to an effective counterinsurgency program, but…not be an effective …

My own preference would be to continue the covert, or at least deniable operations…Then, Rh