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 7.

Thus as winter drew to an end in February-March 1964, it was recognized;, as it had never been fully recognized before, that the situation in Vietnam was deteriorating so rapidly that the dimensions and kinds of effort so far invested could not hope to reverse the trend. This was indeed a turning point. The proposals for neutralization that had been loosely suggested in late fall and early winter having been rejected, the issue to be resolved was what kinds of new efforts, and what new dimensions of U.S. effort, would be decided upon. One direction of effort which might have been chosen had, as its most articulate advocate, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman. This was the policy line that, for better or for worse, was largely rejected. Mainly because of this policy disagreement, Mr. Hilsman left his post at almost the time it became evident that his views were conclusively overruled. At the time of his departure he wrote two memos to the Secretary of State (dated l4 March 1964); one on the Southeast Asia problem generally, one on South Vietnam. The latter of the two affords not only a good summary of his views on the subject, but also a statement of the policy alternatives that were, in significant measure, rejected. (The rejection was of course by no means total. It was a matter of degree and a question of where emphasis should lie among some programs that were not in dispute generically. But the matter of degree and emphasis was in dispute, and it was sufficient not only to induce Hilsman to resign but to alter drastically the course of U.S. involvement.) Hilsman wrote:

In my Judgment, the strategic concept that was developed for South Vietnam remains basically sound. If we can ever manage to have it implemented with vigor, the result will be victory.

The concept is based on the assumption that villages in Southeast Asia are turned inward on themselves and have little or no sense of identification with either the national government or Communist ideology - that the villagers are isolated physically, politically, and psychologically. In such circujustances it is not difficult to develop a guerrilla movement…

A corollary…is that the villagers' greatest desire is security and that if the villagers are given security, some simple progress towards a better life, and -- most important of all -- a sense that the government cares about them and their future, they will respond with loyalty…

On the basis of…[this] assumption, the Rh