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 the will and resolve to oppose the VC be strengthened, and it must he if this war is to be won. 47/

Mr. Kirkpatrick's comment was based upon his recent trip to South Vietnam:

"I agree with the above but must note that even armed with your pessimistic comments following your last visit, I have been shocked by the number of our (CIA) people and of the military, even those whose jobs is always to say we are winning, who feel that the tide is against us. Admittedly, this is based on a limited number of discussions here and in Danang in three days. There are ominous indications that the VC are able to mount larger operations than in the past using bigger arms, including antiaircraft. Vietnamese government reactions are still slow, defensive and reminiscent of French tactics here a decade ago. There are still really no fundamental internal security measures of any effectiveness such as identity cards, block wardens, travel controls, etc.… It is evident that a major factor in VC victories is their superior intelligence based on nationwide penetrations and intimidations at all levels.…Finally, with the Laos and Cambodia borders opened, this entire pacification effort is like trying to mop the floor before turning off the faucet. 48/"

Two days later the Secretary received an advance copy of SNIE 50-64, "Short-term Prospects in Southeast Asia." Its leading conclusion was:

In further explanation of this judgment, it was stated that the situation had been serious for a long time and in recent months it had deteriorated further. The VC had exploited dislocations caused by the November coup and then more recently by the January coup. Just as Minh's reorganization was beginning to be established, Khanh's coup upset everything, and Khanh's regime was not yet assessable. Meanwhile, the VC had improved in their organization and armament, were increasingly aggressive and acting in larger units. Rh