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 departure of Minh and Tho. In the "overall evaluation", there was the following key paragraph:

"January witnessed distinct, if limited, progress in GVN's organization and action, both on political front in Saigon and on counter-insurgency front in countryside. Nevertheless, by January 30, when General Khanh moved swiftly and bloodlessly to take over reins of government, GVN had still not achieved sufficient momentum either to stem growing tide of popular criticism against it or to register meaningful gains against VC. In retrospect, greatest single positive achievement during three months of post-Diem regime was measurable success of General Minh in establishing himself as popular national leader. Measure of his success reflected in General Khanh's obvious effort to keep Minh on his side and exploit Minh's growing popularity for benefit of second post-Diem regime. 46/"

On the same day that the Mission Report was dispatched, CIA addressed to the Secretary of Defense a special report which had just been received by the Director of CIA. by Mr, Peer de Silva (CAS station chief in Saigon) and Mr. Lyman D. Kirkpatrick, concerning the situation in Vietnam with particular respect to the conduct of the war and the prognosis of the stability of the Khanh regime. The de Silva judgment was that

The situation at this moment must be characterized as one in which the population at large appears apathetic, without enthusiasm either for the GVN or the VC sides but responsive to the latter because it fears the VC. The most important single factor appears to be whether or not the rural population will be willing to defend itself against the VC and to support GVN actions against the VC, In this sector there now seems to be less conviction and resolution, and a more widespread inclination to avoid the problems of opposing the VC, and to play both sides in hopes of somehow getting on peacefully and without personal commitment.

…What is needed in this regard and very soon are a series of GVN successes in the military sphere which would go toward implanting and nourishing a popular attitude that the GVN has the means of bringing security and a sense of ease to the rural population and is clearly determined to do so on an ever broadening front throughout the countryside. Only within some such atmosphere of hopefulness can Rh