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 could in any way be considered typical, the forecast would be pessimistic in nature and a complete reappraisal of U.S. effort, approach, and even policy would be indicated. However, viewed in the light of January operational improvements, the forecast remains one of potential long term military progress. 44/

The improvements cited as grounds for not accepting the pessimistic implications were a new military plan to support the pacification program; adoption of U.S. advice concerning GVN management to cope with increasing VC threats, especially around Saigon; and some government operations that seemed to demonstrate improved military leadership, and what he called "victories" while admitting they were not decisive. The difficulty here was that the judgment did not include consideration that these happier signs had come under the regime which had just been overturned by the Khanh coup a day or two before this report was dispatched, which coup, it was acknowledged, would have a disturbing and disruptive effect upon GVN capabilities as they had existed before the coup. Although it was still too soon to predict the full impact of the coup, it seemed "likely that at least part of the operational momentum which was being slowly generated earlier this month will be slowed for a time…"

In closing this assessment, MACV philosophized, in words with which few would disagree, that experiences of the last quarter of calendar year 1963 disclosed "the extent to which military opportunities are dependent upon political and psychological policies and accomplishments in a counter-insurgency environment." And he found the big lesson -- "the broad implication" -- was, that

"no amount of military effort or capability can compensate for poor politics. Therefore, although the prospects for an improved military posture are good, the ultimate achievement of the established military goal depends primarily upon the quality of support achieved by the political leadership of the government of Vietnam at all levels. 45/"

Here again was an explicit judgment that the   of an effective counter-insurgency operation was a stable, broadly based, popular and effective government. It was acknowledged at this time, as it had been acknowledged before concerning other governments, that a government of these qualities did not exist, But along with the acknowledgment that what was described as the   did not exist, there was apparently always the hope that fate would not close in before something happened to change the situation.

The U.S. mission Monthly Status Report, dated 9 February 194, agreed with MACV that it was too soon to judge the effects of the Khanh coup. The Mission Report, following a week after the personal report of MACV, did not hesitate to express explicit regret over the Rh