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 "You could not. go from the airfield to Mytho without an armed guard in full daylight, or … transport anything for fear of ambush by ground although, the Vietnamese themselves could move the freight by some kind of pay-off to the Viet Cong."

In response to this the Secretary said that we were in a very different position than the French had been and that in this sort of war improvement was bound to be slow--a matter of years. But this did not mean we should retain all of our existing personnel in South Vietnam. It would be a waste to do so, and by "keeping the crutch there too long we would weaken the Vietnamese rather than strengthen them."

Within a day or two after this testimony was given there came the Khanh coup, which constituted not only another hard blow to our efforts in Vietnam but also to our confidence that we knew what was going on there. The Khanh coup of 30 January 1964 came as an almost complete surprise to the mission and to Washington. What may be considered in retrospect, but only in retrospect, as the first very general danger signal came in the form of a conversation between the US/DCM in Saigon and Italian Ambassador D'Orlandi, on 20 January, and reported that same evening to Washington. In discussing the current French initiative in Asia (recognition of Communist China and advocacy of neutralization of SEA), the Italian Ambassador had said that the greatest danger to the U.S. position in Southeast Asia lay in the effect it might have upon certain pro-French and potentially neutralist members of the MRC. When asked to clarify, D'Orlandi named Generals Tran Van Don and Ton Thap Dinh as potential leaders of a group that might accept a French neutralization formula, especially if the U.S. position on that issue were not clarified immediately. In reporting the incident the Embassy commented it had no hard evidence of either of these two flirting with neutralization, although because of French training they were frequently cited as pro-French. 36/

A few days later Ambassador Lodge issued a public statement which acknowledged existence of neutralization rumors and proceeded to affirm that U.S. policy remained unchanged and that the U.S., "In solidarity with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, firmly rejects the spurious idea of 'neutralizing' South Vietnam since 'neutralization' would simply be another means of Communist take-over." 37/

The first warning of the coup that may be considered specific and definite, however, did not come until 28 January, when General Khanh told Colonel Jasper Wilson, U.S. Senior MAAG advisor for I Corps, that pro-French, pro-neutralist members of the MRC -- Generals Xuan, Don, and Kim -- were planning a palace coup that would take place as early as 31 January. 38/ Once the coup was effected, they would call for neutralization of South Vietnam, It was not reported that in the conversation with Wilson, Khanh had expressly suggested that he might try a counter coup action. He did say, however, that he planned to go to Saigon that day or on the morrow. In reporting this conversation to Lodge and Harkins in Saigon and to CIA/Washington, CAS cited four other recent intelligence Rh