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 accordance with plans discussed at a meeting with COMUSMACV and the Ambassador.

2. Revise the pacification plans for critical provinces to insure that they reflect scheduling and programming "based on a realistic appraisal of the actual status of the hamlets, the SDC and Civil Guard and ARVN as well as the rehabilitation materials available."

3. Increase U.S. military advisory strength in the thirteen critical provinces (agreed to be critical at Honolulu) in accordance with a table submitted by COMUSMACV.

4. Reinforce USOM representation in thirteen critical provinces starting with Long An in accordance with a proposal from USOM Saigon.

5. Provide uniforms for the SDC with priority on the Delta area.

6. Press the GVN for a clear statement, in form of orders to province chiefs, for continuance and reshaping of the hamlet program.

7. Press the GVN to provide for a Joint General Staff (JCS) chief, and for a III Corps commander with no other responsibilities.

8. Continue to stress to the GVN the need for forceful central leadership and effective and visible popular leadership. 26/

The Secretary's report for the President dated 21 December '63 was gloomy and expressed fear that the situation had been deteriorating long before any deterioration had been suspected (officially). The report began by saying that the situation was "very disturbing," and that unless current trends were reversed within two or three months they would "lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state." The new government of Big Minh was identified as the greatest source of concern because it seemed indecisive and drifting. There seemed to be a clear lack of administrative talent and of political experience. While on the other hand generals who should have been directing military affairs were preoccupied with political matters [i.e., working to assure or to increase their own political power within the RMC].

A second major weakness seemed to the Secretary to be the Country Team. He felt that it lacked leadership and had been "poorly informed" and was "not working according to a common plan." He had found as an Rh