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 officials because, however familiar the junior officers might be with local acts or particular details, they generally lacked knowledge of the overall picture.

There vas unquestionable ambivalence in U.S. official attitudes concerning progress and prospects. Despite the repeatedly expressed qualifications concerning the potentially grave affect of the political instability in Vietnam, the programming and policy formulation as already noted, was without qualification based on optimistic assumptions. In an over-view of the Vietnam War (196O-1963) prepared by SACSA and delivered to the Secretary shortly after his return from South Vietnam, the mission's assessment of military progress was summarized in these terms:

"The evidences of overall military progress were so unmistakably clear that the mission, acknowledging the implications and uncertainties of the power crisis underway in Vietnam, concluded that the GVN military effort had achieved a momentum of progress which held further promise of ultimate victory over the Viet Cong; further, that victory was possible within reasonable limits of time and Investment of U.S. resources. 16/"

The high priority of the Delta problem was recognized, in this same over-view, with the statement that "the mission was impressed with the evidence that the decisive conflict of the war was approaching in the Mekong Delta." The major difficulty there was identified somewhat euphemistically as due to the fact that "the mission found evidences that the Government of Vietnam had overextended its hamlet construction program in these southern provinces." 17/

Not long before this, however, Michael Forrestal in the White House had sent to Secretary McNamara a copy of a           dated 1 September 1963, and prepared by USOM Regional Affairs officers. This gave province by province summaries that were far from encouraging concerning the Delta. In addition to Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces which were the worst, it was said of Kien Tuong that

the program continues to be slow…few hamlets are completed and a fraction of planned militia trained…the one bright spot…remains the Pri Phap area, which is, however, vulnerable militarily should the VC decide to concentrate their efforts against it. The Chief of Province…we feel is totally unqualified. , although the hamlet program continued to increase in numbers…the security situation deteriorated in July and August. The removal of a recently introduced RVN battalion damaged the effort, and a change in leadership dislocated projects underway… Rh