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 In further amplification of this point the Secretary almost claimed, in effect, to have foreseen and to have forecast the degradation of capability that it was then clear (in January 1964) had occurred and, had, in fact continued ever since November, These were his words,

"We didn't say -- but I think you could have predicted that what we had in mind was -- that (l) either Diem would continue his repressive measures and remain in power, in which case he would continue to lose public support and, since that is the foundation of successful counter guerillaguerrilla [sic] operations, the military operations would be adversely affected, or (2) alternatively he would continue his repressive measures and build so much resistance that he would be thrown out, then a coup would take place, and during the period of reorganization following…there would be instability and uncertainty and military operations would be adversely affected. 13/"

No fully persuasive explanation has been discovered of the apparent discrepancy between this foresight concerning the possible ill affects of policticalpolitical [sic] instability and the generally optimistic prognosis and the program based upon that optimism. The Secretary had had [sic] no enthusiasm for the coup. Possibly he adjusted, though reluctantly, to the idea and decided that the political difficulties would either be overcome by means he did not feel it was his duty to explore, or would not be serious or lasting enough to be critical. However, all of the thinking then in vogue about counterinsurgency insisted that favorable political circumstances were essential to success. Therefore, unless it was assumed that favorable political circumstances could be brought about, the counterinsurgency effort was bound to fail. So long as the adverse case was not proved one had to assume ultimately favorable political conditions because it was unthinkable to stop trying.

Even before NSAM 273 was adopted, evidence began to accumulate that the optimistic assumptions underlying it were suspect. First, there was unmistakable and accumulating evidence that, in the period immediately after the coup, the situation had deteriorated in many places as a direct result of the coup. Then came increasing expression of a judgment that this deterioration was not merely an immediate and short lived phenomenon, but something, rather, that continued well after the worst administrative confusions immediately after the coup had been reduced. Finally, the impression, developed in many quarters, and eventually spread to all, that the coup, the situation had been much more adverse than we had recognized officially at the time. Before the end of December, we decided to institute a system of covert checks on the accuracy of our basic intelligence -- a large part of which came from Vietnamese sources. (There was suspicion that the interests of these officials was often Rh