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 the Diem coup, a special meeting on Vietnam was held at CINCPAC headquarters on 20 November. Although this Honolulu meeting was marked by some concern over the administrative dislocation that had resulted from the coup of three weeks before, the tone remained one of optimism along the lines of the October 2 report to the President. Ambassador Lodge took note of what he called the "political fragility" of the new regime, but he was on the whole optimistic, and even mentioned that the statement on U.S. military withdrawal was having a continued "tonic" effect on the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). General Harkins in his report mentioned a sharp increase in Viet Cong (VC) incidents right after the coup, but added that these had dropped to normal within a week, and that there had, moreover, been compensating events such as additional Montagnards coming out of the hills to get government protection. All in all there was some uneasiness, perhaps, about unknown effects of the coup, but nothing was said to suggest that any serious departure was contemplated from the generally optimistic official outlook of late September and early October. And so, with reference to the statements of October 2, NSAM 273 repeated:

"The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963. 2/"

Before examining further the background of NSAM 273 -- especially the appraisals of the Vietnam situation that it reflected -- it is well to review some of the main provisions of that policy statement of 26 November 1963.

NASM 273 was not comprehensive, as the McNamara-Taylor report of 2 October (discussed below) had been, nor as NSAM 288 was later to be. Mainly it served to indicate continuance by the new President of policies already agreed upon, and to demonstrate full support by the United States of the new government of Vietnam (GVN). Both military and economic programs, it was emphasized, should be maintained at levels as high as those in the time of the Diem regime. In addition, there was an unusual Presidential exhortation -- reflecting the internal U.S. dispute over policy concerning Diem and Nhu that had made embarrassing headlines in October -- that:

"The President expects that all senior officers of the government will move energetically to insure the full unity of support for established U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Both in Washington and in the field, it is essential that the government be unified. It is of particular importance that express or implied criticism of officers of other branches be assiduously avoided in all contacts wi±h the Vietnamese government and with the press. 3/"

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