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 sharp debate within the GVN. Something of this sort was needed before taking up the matter of troop arrangements with Quat. 152/

Later the same day, Deputy Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson sent Washington his personal observations on the recent decision to introduce third country troops. He had just returned from one day at Pleiku with Premier Quat, and two days in the Danang-Hue area, where he had had "extended visits and informal conversations with all of the senior Marine officers ashore."

"I fully appreciate considerations both internal and external to SVN which impel move on our part to bring this war to successful conclusion as quickly as possible…However, I gravely question whether this result can be achieved at this time by massive input of non-Vietnamese military forces. As we have learned, we are dealing with volatile and hyper-sensitive people with strong zenophobicxenophobic [sic] characteristics never far below the surface. We have thus far deployed our Marine battalions to minimize direct contact with local population. This not only from our choice but that of GVN, especially General Thi. On this I think Thi is right. Hasty and ill conceived deployment of non-Vietnamese in combat roles where they are substantially involved with local population could badly backfire on U.S. and give rise to cries by Buddhists…and others to 'throw out foreigners' and 'return Vietnam to the Vietnamese…'"

The message went on to say that in the next few weeks the Marines at Danang would have a chance to test their success as a reaction force in support of ARVN initiated contact with the enemy, and in patrolling thinly populated areas. The Deputy Ambassador recommended that we await the outcome of this testing before engaging any more forces. 153/

A hastily arranged meeting in Honolulu on 20 April was evidently called to soothe Taylor's temper over the hasty decisions to deploy third country troops, and to get agreement to them by the senior U.S. policy officials concerned -- not to reverse or alter those policies or to shift the direction of our commitments. By that point we were inexorably committed to a military resolution of the insurgency. The problem seemed no longer soluble by any other means. Rh