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 was proposed that teams be introduced first into only one or two provinces. General Peers was being sent to work with COMUSMACV in developing detailed plans.

The last non-military measure was an experimental plan for distributing food directly to regular and paramilitary personnel and their families. 148 /

Hot on the heels of this message came another on 16 April explaining in some further detail the proposition to experiment with U.S. civil affairs officers in the pacification program. Major General W. R, Peers' party was scheduled to arrive in Saigon on 19 April, According to the proposal COMUSMACV was to designate a senior officer to direct the overall U.S. Army Civil Affairs effort in the one or two test provinces. Within these, the responsibility for all U,S, activities would be vested in the senior U,S. Army sector advisor. 149/

This last message was, for Taylor, the straw that broke the camel's back. Immediately upon receiving it the Ambassador dispatched a NODIS to McGeorge Bundy:

.…Contrary to the firm understanding which I received in Washington, I was not asked to concur in this massive visitation. For your information, I do not concur.

Based on the little I know of the proposed civil affairs experiment, I am opposed to beginning any extensive planning exercise which, because of its controversial and divisive concept, is going to shake this mission and divert senior members from their important daily tasks. If GVN gets word of these plans to impose U.S. military government framework on their country (as this new concept seems to imply), it will have a very serious impact on our relations here.

We are rocking the boat at a time when we have it almost on an even keel. I recommend that we suspend action on this project until we have time to talk over its merits and decide how to proceed with order. 160/

Shortly after dispatching this telegram, the Ambassador sent another to McGeorge Bundy, this one dealing more generally with the defense message of 15 April which had laid out the new program of added measures decided upon by the President.

I am greatly troubled by DoD 152339Z April 15. First, it shows no consideration for the fact that, as a result of decisions taken in Washington during my visit, this mission is Rh