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 2. Assign control over all troops in each province to the province chief.

3. Execute clear-and-hold operations on a hamlet-by-hamlet basis following the "oil spot" theory for each of the approximately 40 districts within the seven critical provinces.

4. Introduce population control programs (curfews, ID papers, intelligence networks, etc.)

5. Increase the number of provincial police.

6. Expand the information program.

7. Develop special economic programs for each province.

8. Add U.S. personnel as follows:




 * a. ||320 ||military advisors in provinces and districts.
 * b. ||| 40 ||USOM advisors in provinces and districts.
 * c. ||| 74 || battalion advisors (2 for each of 37 battalions).
 * ||434 || TOTAL
 * }
 * ||434 || TOTAL
 * }
 * }

9. Transfer military personnel as needed to fill USOM shortages.

10. Establish joint US/GVN teams to monitor the program at both National and Provincial levels. 101 /

5.

The critical question of pressures against North Vietnam remained theoretically moot. The consensus of those formulating policy proposals for final approval by highest authority appears to have been that these pressures would have to be resorted to sooner or later. But the subject was politically explosive, especially in a presidential election year. Accordingly, not only did the basic foreign policy Issues involved need careful exploration, but the domestic political framework needed preparation before any binding commitments to serious actions could be decided upon.

On 15 June 1964, McGeorge Bundy addressed a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense announcing a meeting in the Secretary of State's conference room that same day at 6:00 p.m.

The principal question for discussion will be to assess the desirability of recommending to the president that a Congressional resolution on Southeast Asia should be sought promptly. Rh