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 to company level was not necessary, and that the current advisory structure to ARVN was adequate.

The problem areas cited in all of these proposals to extend the advisory system were the questionable acceptability to the Vietnamese of further intrusion by American advisors, the shortage of interpreters, and finally the inevitable increase in U.S. casualties. 99/

The political problems demanding solutions in order to permit the GVN to proceed effectively in its struggle against the VC were identified in the U.S. preparations for the Honolulu Conference as:

a. The disposition of the senior political and military prisoners from the two coups (there was resentment by some groups over the detention of prisoners at Dalat; on the other hand, there was possible danger to the Khanh regime if they were released).

b. The rising religious tension both Catholic and Buddhist.

c. The split between Buddhists under Thich Tam Chau (moderates) and under Thich Tri Quang (extremists).

d. Petty politicking within the GVN.

e. GVN failure to provide local lectures.

f. GVN failure to appoint Ambassadors to key governments.

g. Inadequate GVN arrangements to handle third country aid.

h. RVNAF failure to protect the population. 100/

It was not within the competence of the Honolulu Conference to come to any decisions concerning the touchy matter of additional pressures against the North; this could be done only at the White House level. Agreement was reached, however, on certain specific actions to be taken with respect to the critical provinces and very shortly after the return of major participants to Washington these actions were approved and instructions were sent to the field accordingly.

On 5 June the Department notified the Embassy in Saigon that actions agreed upon at Honolulu were to be taken with respect to the critical provinces as follows:

1. Move in added South Vietnamese troops to assure numerical superiority over the VC. Rh