Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. C. 1.djvu/107

 …This proposal might also require a close integration of U.S. and Vietnamese pacification activities in Saigon.…

III. In addition to these radical proposals…we continue gravely concerned about the differences between Khanh and the generals, the problem of Big Minh, and the religious differences…

IV. Finally, we wish to consult with you on the manner in which we can…eliminate the business as usual attitude in Saigon.…We will also wish to examine the best means of reducing the problems of dependents.… 96/

On the same day that the foregoing policy guidance went out to Ambassador Lodge, a meeting was held in Washington at William Sullivan's suggestion. Attended by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, John McNaughton, General Goodpastor and William Colby, it considered a policy memo drawn up by Mr. Mendenhall covering most of the same points raised in the message to Lodge. The gist of the memo was that the GVN was not operating effectively enough to reverse the adverse trend of the war against the VC, that the Khanh government was well intentioned but its good plans were not being translated into effective action, and that it was necessary therefore to find means of broadening the U.S. role in Vietnam in order to infuse efficiency into the operations of the GVN. In general, the memo argued the U.S. should become more deeply involved both militarily and otherwise, abandoning the passive advisor role but avoiding visibility as a part of the chain of command. Vietnamese sensitivities imposed limitations, and if it should appear that the United States intruded, the Vietnamese might come to resent our presence. The memo proposed, nevertheless, that the meeting carefully consider a phased expansion of the U.S. role. First, military advisors might be placed in paramilitary units in seven provinces -- about 300 added advisors would be needed for this purpose. Second, in the same seven provinces -- Long An, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Tay Ninh, Hau Ngiah, Quany Ngia, and Phu Yen -- U.S. civilian and military personnel should be interlarded in the administration, about 10 per province for a total of 70. Third, as an experiment, the U.S. might try civilians at district levels to supplement the U.S. military personnel being assigned there. "In view of the traditional distrust of the Vietnamese peasants for military personnel, it is of considerable importance to begin an introduction of American civilian presence at this level to help win support of the peasant population." [Sic] To back up these field operations it was suggested that a joint Vietnamese-American Pacification Operations Committee be established, with high level representation from MACV and USOM on the U.S. side, and from the Defense Ministry, the Joint General Staff (JGS), the Vice President for Pacification, and the Directorate of the Budget and Foreign Aid on the Vietnamese side. This Joint Pacification Operations Committee should be concerned with policy but with  of policies. (This was judged the weak side of the GVN.) U.S. personnel mighty in addition, be introduced at reasonably high levels into the Ministries of Rural Affairs, Interior, Information, Education, Health, Rh