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 a I Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1 TOP SECRET - Sensitive PLANNING BEGINS IN EARNEST The President did, however, issue several "hunting licenses." The Defense Department was directed to examine fully (under the guidance of the State Department's Director of the continuing Task Force on Vietnam) "the size and composition of forces v/hich would be desirable in the case of a possj.ble cojmitment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. 50/ The Ambassador was authorized to sound out Diem on a bilateral defense treaty. 51/ President Kennedy also apparently decided to feel out Diem's reaction on the subject of U.S. combat troops ^ in Vietnam. Vice Pi^esident Johnson left almost immediately to visit South Vietnam and other Asian nations. He was empowered to bring up the question of troops as well as the treaty. But discussions are one thing; firm commitm.ents are quite 8.nother. The range of alternatives that President Kennedy was willing to consider seems clear. What he v?as vj-illing to d£ was quite another matter. Unless he v/as most unlike other politicians and unless the many personal accounts of his style are completely erroneous he vzas v/illing to do what he believed ^^ li^l ^^ ^o — and events in mad-1961 did not force action even though the drill that the Administration went through ms instrumental in defining the probable responses when events did force action. As it quickly turned out, President Diem v/anted neither U.S, troops nor a treaty at that time. He told Vice Pi^esident Johnson that he wanted troops only in the event of overt invasion and shov/ed no interest in a treaty. 52/ Nevertheless^ the Vice President, upon his return, was trenchan in his observations that the time for deeds to replace words v/as fast approaching if the U.S. was to make its declared commitment credible: Our mission arrested the decline of confidence in the United Sta.tes. It did not — in my judgm.ent -- restore any confidence already lost. The leaders were as explicit, as courteous and courtly as men could be in making it clear that deeds must follovr words — soon. We. didn't buy time -- we V7ere given it« If these men I saw at your request Mere bankers, I vrould know -- without bothering to ask -- that there would be no further extensions on -mj note. 53/ Diem may not have been OAiite so disinterested in U.S. troops as he appeared to be. NSAT-l 52 of 11 May had discussed, inconclusively, the proposed buildup of RVNAE from 170,000 to 200,000 in order to create two new divisions to help seal the Laotian border, t'/hen President Diem responded (on 9 June) to Vice President Johnson's invitation to prepare a set of proposals on South Vietnam's military needs, he recoimnended a quantuii jump in strength to 270,000 and suggested a substantial increase in the US NAAG, perhaps even in the form of U.S. units: I 22 TOP SECRET - Sensitive Rh