Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. B. 2.djvu/21

 the reserve forces if possible as they come up to defend; and to dramatize the inability of the GVN to govern or to build;, by the assassination of officials and the sabotage of public works. 16/

The purpose of this military strategy, Taylor asserted, was apparently not to capture the nation by force. Rather, in concert with non-military means, it was to produce a political crisis which would topple the government and bring to power a group willing to contemplate the unification of Vietnam on Hanoi's terms. 17/

It was in the U.S. interest, Taylor reasoned, to act vigorously -- with advice as well as aid --- in order to buy the necessary time for Vietnam to mobilize and to organize its real assets so that the Vietnamese themselves might "turn the tide" and assume the offensive. 18/ But U.S. aid and U.S. advice on where to use it were not enough. The Diem Government itself had to be reformed in order to permit it to mobilize the nation. Diem had, in Taylor's assessment, allowed two vicious circles to develop which vitiated government effectiveness. In the first of these circles poor military intelligence led to a defensive stance designed primarily to guard against attacks, which in turn meant that most of the military forces came under the control of the province chiefs whose responsibility it was to protect the populace and installations. This control by province chiefs meant that reserves could not, because of tangled lines of command and control, be moved and controlled quickly enough to be effective. The effect of high losses in unsuccessful defensive battles served further to dry up the basic sources of intelligence. 19/

The second vicious circle stemmed from Diem's instinctive attempts to centralize power in his own hands while fragmenting it beneath him. His excessive mistrust of many intellectuals and younger Vietnamese, individuals badly needed to give his administration vitality, served only to alienate them, and led them to stand aside from constructive participation -- thereby farther increasing Diem's mistrust. 20/ This administrative style fed back, too, into the military equation and through it, created another potentially explosive political-military problem:

"The inability to mobilize intelligence effectively for operational purposes directly flows from this fact [Diem's administrative practice] as do the generally poor relations between the Province Chiefs and the military commanders, the former being Diem's reliable agents, the latter a power base he fears. The consequent frustration of Diem's military commanders -- a frustration well-known to Diem and heightened by the November 1960 coup -- leads him to actions which further complicate his problem; e.g., his unwillingness to delegate military operations clearly to his generals. 2l/"

General Taylor's recommended actions for the U.S. were designed to demonstrate U.S. commitment in order to strengthen Diem's stand and Rh