Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. B. 1.djvu/196

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

1. , 4 November 1961, p. 1

2. , 29 October 1961, p. 28

3. , 21 October 1961, p. 1

4. , 5 November 1961, p. 1

5..

6. DEPTEL 545 to Saigon, 4 November 1961. The language cited in the footnote is the only completely unambiguous indication of how far the U.S. hoped to go in putting Americans into a direct position of influence in the Vietnamese government and army. But there is plenty of language in the Taylor Mission Report that suggests as much and there is a rather blunt statement, quoted at the end of Section II of this chapter, which Nolting was told to pass on to Diem in explaining the U.S. offer.

7. Sorenson, ., p. 737, says senior advisors "on Vietnam," which presumably did not include someone like George Ball, then Undersecretary of State, who has been widely reported to have opposed any combat troop commitments.

As we will see, Galbraith is also on record against troops. Rusk is on record as deferring combat troops in a Joint McNamara/Rusk memorandum which appears to have been drafted after the President had made his decision (it contradicts a memorandum McNamara signed only three days earlier). We do not know whether Rusk, like McNamara was reversing his position.

8. Saigon message 437, 25 October 1961

9. BAGUIO message 0006, 1 November 1961, EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

10. USDEL Hakone to State, Section 6, 1 November 1961

11. Saigon message 575, 31 October 1961

12. Staff memoranda, 2 and 6 November 1961, by Colonel Kent, OSD(ISA)

13. Summary, Taylor Report, p. 1

14. SNIE 10-4-61, 5 November I961, "Probable Communist Reactions to Certain U.S. Actions in South Vietnam," 5 November 1961

15. . Rh