Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. B. 1.djvu/177

 India. Galbraith did so, and after three days cabled back, among other thing, the advice that it was a waste of effort to bargain with Diem.

On the 20th, the day of Thuan's meeting with Nolting, Galbraith cabled the President:

"There is scarcely the slightest practical chance that the administrative and political reforms now being pressed upon Diem will result in real change.…there is no solution that does not involve a change in government."

On the insurgency, though, Galbraith was optimistic, provided Diem was replaced:

"While situation is indubitably bad military aspects seem to me out of perspective. A comparatively well-equipped army with paramilitary formations number a quarter million men is facing a maximiom of 15–18,000 lightly armed men. If this were equality, the United States would hardly be safe against the Sioux. I know the theories about this kind of warfare.…Given even a moderately effective government and putting the relative military power into perspective, I can't help thinking the insurgency might very soon be settled. 24/"

The following day, Galbraith, now in New Delhi, sent a more detailed appraisal, covering essentially the same ground. Here are some extracts.

… THE VIET CONG INSURRECTION IS STILL GROWING IN EFFECT. THE OUTBREAK ON THE NORTHERN HIGHLANDS IS MATCHED BY A POTENTIALLY EVEN MORE DAMAGING IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AND ESPECIALLY ON THE MOVEMENT OF RICE TO SAIGON.

IN THE ABSENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE ADMIXTURE OF TERROR AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EVANGELISM WE HAD BEST ASSUME THAT IT IS EMPLOYING BOTH. WE MUST NOT FOREVER BE GUIDED BY THOSE WHO MISUNDERSTAND THE DYNAMICS OF REVOLUTION AND IMAGINE THAT BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS DO NOT APPEAL TO US THEY ARE ABHORRENT TO EVERYONE.

IN OUR ENTHUSIASM TO PROVE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION BEFORE WORLD OPINION WE HAVE UNQUESTIONABLY EXAGGERATED THE ROLE OF MATERIAL ASSISTANCE ESPECIALLY Rh