Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. B. 1.djvu/139

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 "It is evident that morale in Vietnam will rapidly crumble -- and in Southeast Asia only slightly less quickly -- if the sequence of expectations set in motion by Vice President Johnson's visit and climaxed by General Taylor's mission are not soon followed by a in Vietnam." [Emphasis added]

"The elements required for buying time and assuming the offensive in Vietnam are, in the view of this mission, the following:


 * 1. A quick U.S. response to the present crisis which would demonstrate by deeds -- not merely words -- the American commitment seriously to help save Vietnam rather than to disengage in the most convenient manner possible. To be persuasive this commitment must include the sending to Vietnam of some U.So military forces.


 * 2. A shift in the American relation to the Vietnamese effort from advice to limited partnership. The present character and scale of the war in South Vietnam decree that only the Vietnamese can defeat the Viet Cong; but at all levels Americans must, as friends and partners -- not as arms-length advisors -- show them how the job might be done -- not tell them or do it for them. 23/

"Perhaps the most striking aspect of this mission's effort is the unanimity of view -- individually arrived at by the specialists involved -- that what is now required is a shift from U.S. advice to limited partnership and working collaboration with the Vietnamese. The present war cannot be won by direct U.S. action; it must be won by the Vietnamese. But there is a general conviction among us that the Vietnamese performance in every domain can be substantially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese on the key problems. Moreover, there is evidence that Diem is, in principle, prepared for this step, and that most -- not all -- elements in his establishment are eagerly awaiting it." 24/

Here is a section titled "Reforming Diem's Administrative Method":

The famous problem of Diem as an administrator and politician could be resolved in a number of ways:

-- By his removal in favor of a military dictatorship which would give dominance to the military chain of command.

-- By his removal in favor of a figure of more dilute power (e,g., Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho) who would delegate authority to act to both military and civil leaders. Rh