Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. B. 1.djvu/117

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  "and above all on whether the effort leads to much more better fighting by Diem's forces. They alone can win in the end."

3. Very clearly foreshadowing the Taylor mission (and perhaps indicating a White House hand in the drafting) the paper states:

"The viability of this plan would be dependent on the degree to which it could and would also result in the GVN accelerating political and military action in its own defense. A judgment on this can only be reached after thorough exploration on the spot with the country team and the GVN."

Finally, here is the list of pros and cons presented (but not evaluated) in the paper.

"

"1. The plan would not in itself solve the underlying problem of ridding SVN of communist guerrillas.

"2. It would not seal off the borders of SVN except for the limited area of operations.

"3. It breaks the Geneva Accords and puts responsibility on the U.S. for rationalizing the action before the U.N. and the world.

"4. It raises questions of U.S. troop relationships with the Vietnamese peasants, montagnards, GVN and its army.

"5. The use of SEATO forces in SVN distorts Plan Five [for major intervention in Laos] although these forces are not a net subtraction.

"6. The risk of being regarded as interlopers a la the French must be considered.

"7. Communist change of tactics back to small-scale operations might leave this force in a stagnant position.

"

"1. The effect on GVN morale of SEATO engagement in their struggle could be most heartening.

"2. It could prevent the Viet Cong move to the next stage of battalion-size, formal organization to challenge the ARVN.

"3. The relatively sophisticated SEATO arms, air power, communications and intelligence might spark a real transformation in ARVN tactics and action. Rh