Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/93

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011   {|
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 * U.S. Army-type training programs; throughout, it is clear that the MAAG looked increasingly to the Self Defense Corps, the Civil Guard, and the National Police to meet the "Viet Minh" internal threat in order to free ARVN for conventional combat training. See especially U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, "Country Statement on MDAP, non-NATO Countries," paragraphs 1, 5, 6, and Section C, of the reports 15 January 1956, 20 July 1956, 21 January 1957, 15 July 1957; also, same headquarters, "Narrative Study," dated 24 August 1958, and "Narrative Statement," dated 25 November 1958 with changes dated 10 May 1959, 9 August 1959, and 8 November 1959. Cf ., Shaplen, op. cit ., 117–119, 137; Warner, op. cit ., 129–136; Scigliano, op. cit ., 162–167; Nighswonger, op. cit ., 43–48, David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York: Random House, 1965), 60–66.
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 * David Hotham, "South Vietnam – Shaky Bastion," New Republic, November 25, 1957, 15; Scigliano, op. cit ., 118–119.
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 * Ibid ., 111–115. The author concluded that the Saigon–Bien Hoa Highway had been undertaken for military reasons, and that "this 20-mile stretch of highway cost more money than the United States provided for all labor, community development, social welfare, housing, health, and education projects in Vietnam combined during the entire period 1954–1961."
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 * ICC, Second Interim Report..., op. cit ., 55.
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 * U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, Memorandum for the President, 17 November 1954, subject: "General Collins' Recommendations Regarding Military Force Levels in Vietnam."
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 * JCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 September 1954, subject: "Retention and Development of Forces in Indochina," sets an objective of a minimum French force of four divisions until four RVNAF divisions were available to replace them; it also stresses that the Geneva Agreement constituted in Vietnam "a major obstacle to the introduction of adequate U.S. MAAG personnel and of additional arms and equipment." In a JCS Memo of 19 October 1954, subject: "Development and Training of Indigenous Forces in Indochina," the Chiefs, noting the Geneva limit on personnel, recommended against MAAG's RVNAF unless "political considerations are overriding." In a Memo of 17 November 1954, subject: "Indochina," the JCS addressed the problem of a 77,000 man RVNAF, and found it adequate for internal security only; noting the Viet Minh strength, they stated that a force of that size could not provide for external security if French forces were withdrawn, but agreed that the MAAG could train RVNAF at that level while complying with Geneva ceilings on personnel. Other examples of the continuing U.S. concern for observing the Geneva Agreements on the one hand, and on the other hand proceeding with the task of providing for Vietnam's security within its restrictions are provided in the MAAG, Country Statements, op. cit ., and in U.S. Dept of State telegram 2601 from Paris, of 19 December 1954, in which Secretary Dulles accepted
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