Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/74

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  the other, the GVN condemned what were termed "national movements, such as 'Patriotic Front,' 'United Front,' or 'Fatherland Front,' [which] were in reality of communist inspiration...simply and solely directing communist propaganda and subversive agencies in the zone controlled by the national government." It claimed that responsive to orders from Hanoi, these organizations were conducting a systematic campaign of terror and subversion. During the two and one half years from 1957 through July, 1959, 174 assassinations involving 10 servicemen, 20 civil guards, 65 village officials and 59 civilians were reported by the GVN to the ICC. The White Paper concluded on the note that:

""Contrary to their official declarations, the Viet-Minh Communists have turned their back upon the interests of the Vietnamese people.

"Is it a question of the reunification of the country? They have conceived of it as a simple subordination to Red Imperialism. In North Vietnam, democratic liberties are scoffed at, sacred human rights trampled under foot. How could the Vietnamese people express their real will under this reign of terror where liberty is nothing but a word?

"Desirous to realize the reunification of the country through freedom and in freedom, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly, but in vain, summoned the Communists to re-establish and respect the fundamental liberties to which human beings are entitled. This appeal was made in order to create a favorable atmosphere for really free general elections.

"Not only are the Viet-Minh Communists enemies of democracy and freedom, but they continue to mobilize their forces to sabotage peace in this part of the world.

"The unceasing reinforcement of the Communist armed forces, the importation, in great numbers, of arms and munitions into North Vietnam, secret arm and ammunition dumps left in the territory of the Republic of Viet-Nam, subversive manoeuvres carried out by Communist cadres constitute tangible and irrefutable evidence of their deliberately aggressive intentions.""


 * 9.

In the meantime, the ICC tried to engage the Geneva Conference machinery to provide a substitute for France in Vietnam, with no better success than the DRV. Acting on an ICC report, the U.K. made representations to the GVN in December, 1955, on behalf of the ICC, but received no reply until April, 1956, in which the GVN promised to cooperate with the ICC, but again declined to accept responsibility for the Geneva Settlement. In May, 1956, the Co-chairmen asked the ICC to remain functioning beyond its contemplated termination in July, 1956, despite the informality of its relations with the GVN. The ICC agreed, on May 27, 1956, to "continue dealing with the parties concerned on the basis of 'status quo.'" "Status quo" by that time involved the ICC directly with the U.S. aid program. For example, in April, 1956, the GVN notified the ICC through the French that it had accepted a U.S. proposal to augment the U.S. MAAG in May 1956, with a 350-member group to be called the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM), tasked to assist in the evacuation of U.S. military equipment and supplies left Rh