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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  followers, it was clearly understood by all rank and file that the regroupment instructions were an order, and most responded as did one POW: "I did my duty as a soldier." Some were told to go; some to marry, then go; some to stay. After the initial regroupment in 1954, no further large-scale movement northward was encouraged by the DRV. The outburst of enthusiasm for regroupment which resulted in demonstrations in Saigon in April 1955, and DRV support for same, can be attributed to growing conviction that Diem might succeed in his drive for political control, and that he or the U.S. would not permit general elections, or to a tactical cover for the DRV's own difficulties with clamoring would-be refugees.

As of March 1967, a report was available on 23 Viet Minh who stayed behind in 1954. These men had been systematically interviewed, and while they comprise a slender sample, their replies give no evidence that violence or sabotage were included in the initial orders of any; rather, they received organizational and propaganda missions:

""POW: We were given training about the Geneva treaty. We were instructed to work normally with the peasants, to earn a living and to explain to them the clauses of the treaty. We pointed out that general elections would be held in 1956.""

Another distributed leaflets, hung posters and organized meetings to promote the plebescite. One had orders "to work as a core cadre exhorting the population to demand negotiations with North Vietnam for a general election." Still another distributed petitions demanding elections, trade relations with DRV, and peace.

However, this "political action" never promised much, since the GVN never seemed disposed toward holding the elections. When in July 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem dismissed with finality any prospect for consultations, the lines began to be drawn between the "stay-behind" cadre and the Saigon government. After 1956, the last illusions were dispelled, and the Viet Minh apparatus went wholly underground.


 * D.


 * 1.

The Geneva Conference intended to fix a ceiling on foreign military personnel, bases and arms in Vietnam corresponding to the levels of July 1954. Within months of the Conference, the DRV and the GVN were each led to believe that the other was contravening those arms control provisions of the Settlement. The DRV could claim, with justification, that the United States was introducing new arms and personnel, assuming an amplified military role in Vietnam, and acquiring bases. The GVN could accuse the DRV, again with justification, of Rh