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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  (1) Measures that Diem had, in fact, requested, and that required U.S. action, principally the proposed 20,000-man increase in ARVN.

(2) Measures which the GVN currently had "under study" or which would shortly be presented to the GVN, but on which foot-dragging and some resistance could be expected; such as implementation of a firm military chain of command (in particular, willingness by Diem to cease by-passing his military staff and commanders in dealing with province chiefs and subordinate commanders); establishment of a military operational command for counterinsurgency operations; and development of a national plan for counterinsurgency.

(3) Recommendations "considered by the Country Team to be indispensable and in the GVN's own best interests," but which would "probably not be particularly palatable to the GVN"; this situation pertained particularly to certain political actions and concepts of the military-civilian relationship. (For example, strengthening the role of the National Assembly, and including respected oppositionists in the Cabinet.)

The disagreement between the Ambassador and Chief, MAAG, evident in the CIP, reflected the divergences that were to persist among U.S. decision-makers through 1961. Durbrow's position, reflected in later, similar dispatches to the state Department, and to the President himself, was that the unpalatable political measures aimed at "liberalizing" the regime were essential to the achievement of U.S. (and GVN) goals in Vietnam. Therefore, in the face of resistance to such measures by Diem it was necessary to assert some leverage to win his acceptance; and the most expedient means of leverage would be to postpone or threaten withholding of those measures of support that Diem actually wanted, until Diem should have complied with our aims in the political area. In the case of the program represented by the CIP, this could only mean withholding approval of part or all of the funding for the 20,000 man force level increase that Diem (backed by MAAG) had requested. Earlier, Durbrow may have turned to this tactic because of a suspicion that the 20,000-man increase was not really essential. By January 1961, he was evidently prepared to agree on the need for additional troops (referring to the increasing threat posed by the Soviet airlift in Laos), but he still pointed to the tactical requirement that somehow Diem had to be induced to take unpalatable political actions. "These questions are an integral part of the overall plan and are essential to its Successful accomplishment. Consideration should, therefore, be given to what actions we are prepared to take to encourage or, if necessary to force, acceptance of all essential elements of the plan." Rh