Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/361

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  "MAAG Comments :

The military requirement for this force increase to accomplish the current mission had been demonstrated in MAAG considered opinion as early as August 1960. This force increase was badly needed before the beginning of the Soviet airlift in Laos. The recent Viet Minh overt aggression against Laos merely reinforces this requirement.

The four divisions in the North in I and II Corps Areas are committed in anti-guerrilla and static guard duty to the extent which not only cuts down on their ability to resist overt attack, and thus magnifies the risk to a militarily unacceptable degree, but also prohibits required training to adequately counter either external or internal aggression."

But otherwise, the CIP represented agreement on what the problem was in Vietnam, and what steps were necessary to solve it:

""I. SITUATION. . . Developments in South Viet-Nam over the past year indicate a trend that is adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government. Beginning in December 1959 and continuing to the present, there has been a mounting increase throughout South Vietnam of Viet Cong terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. …

Politically, discontent with the Diem Government has been prevalent for same time among intellectuals and elite circles and has been rising among the peasantry and, to some extent, labor and urban business groups. Criticism of these elements focuses on Ngo family rule, especially the roles of the President's brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. and Madame Nhu and the influence of the clandestine Can Lao political apparatus of the regime. An even more important element in the political situation is the criticism of the President's leadership within government circles, including the official bureaucracy and the military. In the past, such discontent and criticism had been centered on Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, as directors of the allegedly corrupt Can Lao Party.

Ftlrther aggravating many of the govermuent's problems is the active and partly successful campaign of the Viet Cong to discredit President Diem and weaken the government's authority through political subversion, as well as through military action. Among other factors making this possible is" Rh