Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/359

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  thinking is required here. Our thinking must be beamed towards evolving a new concept of action - a synthesis of the useable portions of history, the closely coordinated military and political concepts of our enemy, and the application of both conventional and unconventional warfare. All of these welded together by proper application of the principles - which will still remain valid - must be employed in the operations of our hunter-killer teams of 'antiguerrilla guerrillas.'

For we must find a better way but only to counter the Viet Cong guerrilla in the swamps, the canal-gridded, inundated Mekong River delta, and the rugged mountains and jungles of both the high plateau and the entire land border region - but to crush him! …

" … Militarily, our problem appears two-fold: First, reduce or eliminate VC intervention from outside. Second, prevent the growth and possible final complete military success of VC military action, while awaiting solution of the political 'causes'. This VC military success can happen here - it is our job to prevent it. At present, better use of military resources is Vietnam's only readily available solution - and it is at best a marginal one.

"And finally, as a basis for your analysis, remember that the conventional organizations such as corps, divisions and regiments can be very adaptable to antiguerrilla operations …

"I feel we should now reemphasize the basic actions and recommendations already implemented by this MAAG to assure a better RVNAF capability in fighting VC internal subversion by setting up the framework of a more responsive organization and command procedure. These actions included the following:

a. MAAG recommended the transfer of the Civil Guard (CG) from the Department of Interior to the Department of Defense for equipping, training and operational control with command vested in RVNAF …

b. MAAG recommended to the RVNAF and the GVN that the overall RVNAF command structure be modified to give clear lines of military control for all military type operations.

c. MAAG recommended a rotation plan which would re-establish tactical unity and integrity of units, give military commanders responsibility for pacification of a permanently assigned area, and allow for rotation within division or even possibly regimental size units - as a minimum. Rh