Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/358

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  weakness of its built-in inflexibility and the longer reaction time required for its conventional type action -- and yes, even its conventional type thinking! Thinking which is too often geared to highly sophisticated weapons systems, complex logistics, stylized or rigid tactics, and vulnerable lines of communications … "

"Thus, from the purely military point of view, the solution hinges on the capability of the armed forces to protect the very lives of the people - to include government functionaries, from mounting communist assassination and intimidation. In the far-flung villages, especially those isolated from governmental protective power in point of time, space and force, this is most difficult. The guerrilla, because of mobility and a battle-tested plan, together with the unique situation here, has been able to seize the initiative by taking the military offensive. This is because all of the elements of national power have not been adequately coordinated in the past. The government of the armed forces are literally blind due to a lack of information on VC guerrilla actions and intentions. As indicated previously, the military particularly must have adequate, evaluated, collated military intelligence if it is to be able to best apply its present force. To the military man - especially the commander of a small military group defending his country against the VC guerrillas in the swamps or jungles - timely, accurate, evaluated intelligence - not false rumor - spells the difference between success or defeat - life or death. With both the present military and political situation a matter for serious concern, it appears logical that the time has come when the armed forces must have the necessary force to give the population full and complete physical protection from the VC. Because of various reasons - some within and some beyond the immediate control of the Government of Vietnam - this cannot be done to the required degree at present …

"Now, let us examine the broad objective of the MAAG in South Vietnam. As advisors, you must not only advise but follow through! Therefore, you must clearly understand that proper advising requires an instructor-pupil relationship with explanation, illustration and close personal supervision. It is not enough to tell your counterparts what to do and stop there. Your government prohibits your accompanying troops on wartime operations, but this does not lessen - only adds to - your advisory mission. Also, it is most important you understand that even as you cannot make a 'template type solution' of conventional concepts work on varied terrain, the same is true of solutions based on unconventional concepts … Objective, creative-type Rh