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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  "we approve force level increase and his action raising civil guard ceiling by 10,000. While I still believe it absolutely essential he adopt more liberal programs, it is not certain from his attitude and remarks that he will take effective action in these matters, although I learned later he has agreed to engage the services of a public relations expert suggested by CAS to make a survey of GVN foreign public relations needs." ( Ibid ., pp. 3-4)"

4. The Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP)

The expectations of the Department of Defense for the amelioration of Diem's security Situation, as well as those of State and the Embassy, were embodied in a Counterinsurgency Plan for Vietnam (CIP), prepared over the months April to December 1960, and forwarded to Washington for approval on 4 January 1961 (Saigon despatch 276, date cited). The CIP represented a considerable evolution in the U.S. concepts of how to cope with Vietnam's internal security. During 1959 and early 1960, Diem, recognizing the precariousness of his position, had begun to experiment with the structure of his security forces, seeking to find a mix of police, paramilitary, and regular military forces capable of countering the Viet Congo The U.S. MAAG, Vietnam, though constantly handicapped by personnel ceilings imposed out of respect for the Geneva Accords, had labored to build a modern national army, capable of both delaying invading forces from North Vietnam and of coping with internal threats; in the pre-1960 MAAG view, Diem was trifling with his army. In early 1960 the US decided, Rh