Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/352

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  General Lansdale seems on sound ground in arguing that continued nagging, let alone stronger pressures, to win Diem's acceptance of political changes he did not want and which he regarded as specific threats to his regime, could only subtract from Diem's confidence in the U.S. This in turn imperiled hopes of winning his cooperation on military measures believed crucial to security. Nevertheless, the State Department endorsed the Ambassador's notions for continued representations to Diem on the urgency of political reforms, and instructed him to follow up his 14 October demarche on the liberalization of his regime. In his approach to Diem, the Department suggested the Ambassador follow the line: "" … Would prefer, for moment, put aside questions internal reforms GVN calculated primarily increase its efficiency (such as Internal Security Council) and focus on liberalization since any announcements GVN makes this subject will be matter great public interest … " (Underlining added)

" … It Embassy's observation events November 11 and 12, whatever their cause, have led to increased atmosphere uneasiness and some doubt projected reforms ~ill be adequate (Embtel 1151). This adds emphasis to basic premise against which, we believe, program of liberalization should be tested: it should be genuine, if limited, liberalization on several fronts to be annoilllced simultaneously … if liberalization not clear cut and genuine and not made on several fronts, public will feel deceived and GVN will "lose rather than gain popular support … " (Deptel 898 to AmEmbassy Saigon, 15 December 1960, pp. 1-2)"

The Department picked out several "liberalization" measures from the 14 October demarche, including the right of the National Assembly to investigate the GVN; greater freedom for domestic press; better relations with the foreign press; and several rural measures.

Durbrow reported on the resulting conversation with Diem:

" … While Diem was pleasant during hour and three-quarters of discussions, he was basically negative. Diem did not reply to my remarks immediately but insisted essential have additional 20,000 troops since would do no good to try to put in reforms, build factories, roads and bridges, etc., unless these things and people could be protected. He referred several times to the need for 20,000 men stressing need because of deteriorating Lao situation. I then remarked we had just learned that he had increased force level of civil guard to 64,000 and asked if this increase would not fill security force needs. Rh