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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  in "implementation" later associated with the strategic hamlet program were already discernible in the administration of the agrovilles by the Diem regime.)

One dissent by the Department from Durbrow's recommendations was on the Can Lao: ""As to surfacing or abolishing Can Lao suggest that to ask for this and removal Nhus and Tuyen simultaneously would be too much … If considered necessary, question could be raised later." ( Ibid .)"

On 14 October} Ambassador Durbrow had his opportunity for frank discussion alone with Diem. He began by reading, in French, a 14-page paper containing the suggestions agreed to by the Department. {{quote|" … Before reading text I stated that on October 13 I had been in Viet-Nam for three and one half years, had found my assignment edifying, interesting, and most worthwhile. I mentioned solid and worthwhile progress I had noted in country since 1957 and congratulated President on his many fine accomplishments. I then stated that since I admired his courage and determination I personally desired to do all I could to help him} particularly in these trying times. I added I personally, and other friends of his here as well as those in Washington, have been giving much thought about how we might be helpful to him. Results of our thinking led to conclusion that we could be most helpful if we should make several suggestions which I could put to him in a frank manner as a friend. I then read the paper.

" … When I finished reading President stated that most of suggestions I had made conformed to his basic ideas, but added as much as he would like to put these into effect} stepped-up activities of the Viet Cong made it most difficult. He added that many people have been intimidated by Viet Cong and some had been won over so that it would be difficult to carry out some of steps regarding countryside. I replied while I realized difficulties I was firmly convinced after most careful consideration that it essential now to take many if not all of these suggested steps on a calculated risk basis in order to creat the psychological shock which I believed essential at this time. President made no further comment except to tell me that he would consider the. suggestions I had given him.

"I then again begged his indulgence and asked if I could bring up a most sensitive and delicate matter which I felt in his interest and in interest of Viet-Nam I should discuss very frankly. From notes in French which I read but did not leave }} Rh