Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/329

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  "proportions that any general is ready to take initiative in leading coup. We cannot of course exclude· emergence of a 'Kong Le' from ranks below general but key units in and around Saigon are commanded by officers believed to be close and loyal to Diem." (Saigon 538 to SecState, 5 September 1960, Section 2 of 2, p. 1)"

Two months later, in November 1960, an abortive "Kong Le" coup came close to succeeding, led by LTC Nguyen Chanh Thi, one of those believed to have been most close and loyal to Diem.

The cable concluded that: "" … Real possibility demonstrations in Saigon exist … any demonstration more likely to be initially loyal protests calling for changes in policies and personnel around Diem but could develop into anti-Diem riot … " ( Ibid ., p. 2)"

Ten days later, Durbrow sent a long analysis of the threats confronting Diem, with recommendations for counter-measures, as a precursor to presenting Diem with strong U.S. representations on the need for changes. This discussion well expressed the complex problems in which Diem was enmeshed, all of which had to be met adequately if the regime was to survive; and it was an unusually explicit listing of the sort of "reforms," so often alluded to since the Eisenhower letter of October 1954, felt to be required if the Diem regime were to be politically viable. ""As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-communistic in origin but communists can be expect ed to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-Nam to communists. These two dangers are related because communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent communist take-over in Viet-Nam. "Essentially two sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measure s needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers." (Saigon 624 to SecState, Section 1 of 2, 16 September 1960, p. 1, underlining added)" Rh