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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources … elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support had not left the planning stage and the Vietnamese government is handicapped by incompetent cabinentcabinet [sic] ministers and the lack of competent administrators." (NIE 9 of 4 June 1953, p.3)

"Finally, unless the French Union forces prove strong enough to provide security for the Vietnamese population, it will not be possible to sweep the guerrillas out of the areas as planned. Not only will the populace fail generally to provide the intelligence required to rout the guerrillas but, as in the past, they will frequently give warning of the presence of the French Union forces, thus permitting the guerrillas to take cover and later to emerge when the danger is past." ( Ibid ., p. 5)

Seven years later, the estimate of August 1960 was pointing out:

"" … Viet Cong guerrilla units have succeeded in exploiting their natural advantages of surprise, mobility, and initiative. In many of their areas of operations, they have exploited the tendency of the largely passive population to accommodate to their presence and thereby avoid reprisals. In some areas of operations, however, they have obtained the active cooperation of the local population." (SNIE 63.1-60, p. 3)

"In the absence of more effective government measures to protect the peasants and to win their positive cooperation, the prospect is for expansion of the areas of Viet Cong control in the countryside, particularly in the southwestern provinces.

"Dissatisfaction and discontent with the government will probably continue to rise unless the security situation improves and unless Diem can be brought to reduce the corruption and excesses of his regime . . . ""

The conclusions of the estimate were the most ominous since 1956:

"Developments within South Vietnam over the past six months indicate a trend adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's government … "

"Although Diem's personal position and that of his government are probably not now in danger, the marked deterioration since January of this year is disturbing. These adverse trends are not Rh