Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/318

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  confidence of the VC in their ability to successfully conduct such operations. This self assurance and aggressiveness appear to be characteristic of many actions taken by the VC since September and have probably contributed to the low state of morale reported in GVN security units by CAS sources." (Despatch 278 from Saigon, Encl. No.1, p. 3)

It was incidents like this and "particularly an attack on an ARVN regimental post near Tay Ninh in January, that brought on "the full impact of the seriousness of the present situation": ""The Viet Cong attack on the Vietnamese Army installation near Tay Ninh on January 26 is a dramatic illustration of the increasingly aggressive tactics of the Viet Cong and of the difficulty the GVN is having in controlling the internal security situation. The audacity of the Viet Cong in conducting the attack, the likelihood of VC infiltration into ARVN, the indications of secret support of the VC by some of the local populace, the successful planning and coordination in carrying out the attack as opposed to apparent failure of ARVN which had been told there might be an attack to be sufficiently alert for such an attack and effectively counter once the attack had been launched, are indications of many of the problems faced by the GVN and discussed in this report." ( Ibid, p. 1)"

Armed propaganda operations involving large numb ers of Viet Cong in daylight were a third category of Viet Cong activities.

" … The fact that the VC can, and have on a number of occasions, entered fair sized communities, spent several hours or a day propagandizing the population and then retired without meeting GVN resistance would indicate that the VC have an effective 'intelligence system." ( Ibid, p. 5)

"CAS sources have reported a gradual increase of the infiltration of VC cadres and arms from the DRV over the past few months which has increased the VC strength to about 3000 in the Southwest. (Bas ed on available information CAS estimates that the Viet Cong strength in all South Viet-Nam is presently 3000-5000 men.) Many of these new infiltrators, according to a CAS source who is a GVN Official, are cadres who were regrouped in the North at the time of the Geneva Accords and have had a number of years of intensive military and political training. The principal infiltration route of VC cadres from the North continues to be through Laos to Cambodia although reports are received of infiltration by sea. A CAS source with similar access reports that some of the cadres arriving in SVN from the North have the mission of establishing a VC headquarters to Rh