Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/313

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  The relative importance of Vietnam in the U.S. world-view is further attested to by the fact that MAAG Vietnam, though limited in size out of regard for the Geneva Accords 1955-1960, was the only military aid mission commanded by a Lieutenant General. MAAG strength was held at 342 (plus 350 personnel in TERM), but the U.S. economic aid mission grew rapidly over the years, becoming by mid-1958, the largest in the world:

Source: Montgomery, .., 177.

However, it has been argued that despite this largesse of treasure, technical help, and goods, the U.S. failed to provide for Vietnam's security precisely because its aid emphasized security, rather than ameliorating those economic and social problems which formed the basis for popular discontent. It is certainly true that the bulk of U.S. assistance was concentrated on security. Although from the table above Military Grants comprised only 25% of the total U.S. program 1955-1961, more than 75% of the economic aid the U.S. provided went into the GVN military budget. Out of every $10 of U.S. economic aid the U.S. obligated for Vietnam, about $8 were extended through an import-subsidization program. The U.S. would purchase goods with dollars outside Vietnam, sell them to Vietnamese importers for piasters, and then deposit this local currency in a drawing account for the GVN. This defense supporting assistance was very crucial to Diem, since in the period 1956-1960, some 43% of GVN public expenditures were allocated directly to the military for the armed forces and Self-Defense Corps (Scigliano, .., 113).

Source: RAC-TP-232, .., II, 20-21. Rh