Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/301

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  ""The Diem Government's resistance to communist demands for all-Vietnam elections, under the Geneva Accords, and its success in achieving internal security increase the likelihood of enlarged communist subversive efforts. This underlines the necessity of assisting the Diem Government to develop further counter-measures with considerable emphasis on police and para-military forces and civic action … The Vietnamese are increasingly critical of the general orientation and specific procedures of our aid program. Their request for an increased emphasis on capital development with consequent dimunition of the flow of consumer goods entering the country will require careful review …"

a. NSC 5612/1

During the summer of 1956 the NSC Planning Board conducted a review of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, and on September 5, 1956, the NSC adopted a new "Statement of Policy" (NSC 5612/1) which after stipulating that "the loss to Communist control of any single free country would encourage tendencies toward accommodation by the rest … ", noted that: ""Although Communist policy now emphasizes non-military methods, the danger of overt aggression will remain inherent so long as Communist China and North Viet Nam continue a basically hostile policy supported by substantial military forces. There is only a cease-fire in Viet Nam and sporadic hostilities continue in Laos … At present overt aggression and, except in the cases of Viet Nam and Laos, militant subversion are less likely than an intensified campaign of Communist political, economic and cultural penetration in the area.""

NSC 5612/1 laid out the following objectives for Vietnam:

""Assist Free Vietnam to develop a strong, stable and constitutional government to enable Free Viet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present Communist zone."

"Work toward the weakening of the Communists in North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership."

"Support the position of the Government of Free Viet Nam that all-Viet Nam elections may take place only after it is satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both zones of Viet Nam."

"Assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh.""

Rh