Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/293

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  11 independent Infantry Regiments, 5 Security Regiments, plus comb at support and service support units. In addition, there are para-military forces estimated to number up to approximately 235,000 personnel, which are organized as two separate forces, the Provincial Forces and the Armed Militia …

" (2) Capabilities : …Although it is highly probable a some advance indication or warning will be received, an attack on South Vietnam by Viet Cong forces could occur without warning at any time. With or without warning, it must be realized that the initiative, at least during the initial stages of a war, will rest with the Viet Cong. Accordingly, it must be assumed that the enemy will be able to provide for the necessary build-up of his forces, execute planned deployments and launch his attack at selected points at his own time and convenience .... In conjunction with the conduct of operations by military forces, the Viet Cong will employ to the maximum guerrilla forces and subversive, dissident elements already in place in South Vietnam. The strength of these elements is currently estimated at approximately 2000 personnel, a majority of whom are armed. It can be expected that the Viet Cong will make every effort to reinforce these elements prior to and during the initiation of hostilities in order to enhance their capability for the conduct of guerrilla warfare, create internal disorder, and execute sabotage and conduct attacks on pre-selected critical targets within South Vietnam for the primary purpose of impeding or interfering with operations being undertaken by South Vietnam armed forces …

"(3) Possible Courses of Action :

"(a) Continuation of Viet Cong attempts to gain control of South Vietnam through a combination of diplomatic, economic, political and subversive means.

"(b) Overt use of military force against neighboring states is most likely to be undertaken unilaterally by the Viet Cong, but would be most likely a part of an all-out Communist effort to take all of Southeast Asia."

Washington estimates were, however, beginning to reflect concern over Diem's political solvency. For example, an Operations Coordinating Board Progress Report on U.S. policy in mainland Southeast Asia, dated May 28, 1958, drew attention both to an increase in communist subversive and terrorist pressures against the Diem regime, and to aspects in Diem's political style that could limit the ability of his regime to cope with those pressures: Rh