Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/288

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  dissidents total approximately 850. No effective resistance is anticipated from the few remaining Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Activity of Viet Minh cadres in Free Vietnam has accelerated. While primarily political in nature, it does pose a threat to internal security. These cadres are attempting to infiltrate and take over the dissident sects. Reports indicate that they have succeeded in these efforts with a fraction of the Hoa Hao. On the other hand, approximately 7,000 sect troops have indicated their loyalty by joining forces with the government and have recently been integrated as a part of the National Army."

" … It appears that the Communist efforts are mainly in a passive stage of long-range subversion of the 'will to fight.' The Vietnamese Psychological Action Section is increasing its efforts to counter 'Red propaganda'. Improvement of social status, security, and living standards are essential elements in preventing susceptibility to Communist subversion which may detract from the effectiveness of military forces."

"The Vietnamese Army is considered capable of establishing and maintaining internal security throughout the populous areas of Free Vietnam against dissident sects and other anti-government elements .... "

"The Binh Xuyen have been destroyed as an effective anti-government military force and a major portion of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao forces have been integrated into the National Army."

"Intelligence reports indicate that despite heavy losses due to military operations and desertions, the Viet Minh organization in Free Vietnam remains a serious problem. Recent mergers of other dissident and rebel elements with the Viet Minh, have considerably strengthened the Viet Minh cause."

"The Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps (in villages throughout Free Vietnam) are of material assistance in supplementing the efforts of the Vietnamese Army in the accomplishment of the internal security mission. As these para-military units become better equipped and trained, their increased capability for assuming the major role in maintaining internal security will afford necessary relief of Army units for training. Simultaneously, this will add to Free Vietnam's potential for providing resistance to external aggression."

An NIE of May 1957 on "The Prospects for North Vietnam" (NIE 63.2-57), considered that the communist leaders in North Vietnam, despire "sporadic outbursts of violence," remained "in firm control largely because of the loyalty and effect iveness of the army." However, they were considered crucially dependent on the USSR and CPR, and were Rh