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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  The Estimate noted that the French might decide that in order to preserve their relationship with the U. S., "it is essential to support an anti-Communist South Vietnam, postponing elections if necessary. The French would feel, however, that such a course would involve a substantially increased risk of renewed hostilities with the Viet Minh …" ( Ibid ., p. 8) ""We believe that the French estimate that South Vietnam cannot be held over the long term, except at very high cost." ( Ibid ., p. 8)"

The French were unlikely to provide Diem with the "full and positive support" -- despite a French-U.S. understanding of September 29, in which the French agreed "to support Diem in the establishment of a strong, anti-Communist regime in Vietnam " ( ibid ., p. 7). "Diem will probably not be able to reestablish the authority of the government throughout South Vietnam and to tackle effectively the multitude of pressing problems now facing the country." ( Ibid ., p. 8) Thus, the Estimate ended on a gloomy note: "We believe, on the basis of present trends, it is highly unlikely that South Vietnam will develop the strength necessary to counter growing Communist subversion within its border; it almost certainly would not be able to defeat the Communists in countrywide elections . Even before the elections scheduled for 1956, the probable growth of Communist influence in the South may result in strong pressures with in South Vietnam for coalition with the North."( Ibid ., p. 9)

Subsequently, reassured by Diem's successes in subduing a variety of non-communist challenges to his leadership, the U.S. moved into the key role in support of Diem it had earlier hoped the French might undertake. Yet the question posed by the French appreciation of the situation remained hanging: Was it possible to hold South Vietnam "over the long term" without a "very high cost"?

3· Sect Warfare, 1955-1957

By the spring of 1955, Diem was engaged in a sharp confrontation with the Binh Xuyen gangsters and with the religious sects of the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, and the possibility was recognized that he might (as in fact, he did) win victory and increase his prestige and authority. Nevertheless, an estimate of 26 April 1955 was still pessimistic about his longer-term prospects:

"Even if the present impasse were resolved, we believe that it would be extremely difficult, at best, for a Vietnamese government, regardless of its composition, to make progress toward developing a strong, stable anti-Communist government capable of resolving the basic social, economic, and political Rh