Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/280

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  As the year 1954 wore on, the near paralysis of the government and the increasing challenges to Diem's leadership from non-communist elements seemed increasingly to confirm the judgment U.S. estimates ascribed to the communists: that no forceful measures open violations of the Geneva Agreement, risking U.S. intervention -- would be necessary to achieve the eventual extension of DRV authority throughout Vietnam. These developments reinforced the U.S. expectation that the communists would stand back from open intervention, at least until the scheduled date of elections in July 1956.

Yet, as early as November, 1954, a National Estimate projected the likelihood that if -- contrary to expectations -- the communists should be denied a victory by political means on or before July 1956, they would turn to violent means, using their remaining apparatus in the south for terrorism and guerrilla action and reinforcing it by infiltration. According to NIE 63-7-54, 23 November 1954 (p. 9): ""We believe that the Viet Minh will continue to gain in political strength and prestige and, with Chinese aid, to increase its military striking power in North Vietnam. The Viet Minh probably now feels that it can achieve control over all Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe that the Communists will exert every effort to accomplish their objectives through means short of war…"

"If, on the other hand, South Vietnam should appear to be gaining in strength or if elections were postponed over Communist objections, the Communists probably would step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain control over the area…""

As of late 1954, the Estimate stated the "present key to political power in South Vietnam" was still held by the French. "Under present circumstances, only the French can provide to the legitimate governing authority in Vietnam the power it now lacks, and force the coalescence of the various factions, groups, and individuals." ( Ibid ., p. 5) As for Diem himself: "Diem, the leading lay Catholic in Vietnam, is honest, austere, and widely respected for his integrity and nationalistic zeal… However, Diem is rigid, unwilling to compromise, and inexperienced in the rough and tumble of politics. He is acutely suspicious of his colleagues on the political scene and is inclined to seek advice among a small group of relatives and close friends who, for the most part, are incapable of proffering sound counsel … None of the groups opposing Diem has any broad-based popular support. It is the weakness of Diem rather than any genuine political strength of their owm that enables them to prolong the political crisis in Saigon…" ( Ibid ., p. 4) Rh