Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/279

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  these threats, and usually the odds were judged to be against his surmounting either in the long run.

However, U.S. estimates in the bmnediate aftermath of Geneva held that a forceful direct communist challenge was unlikely through 1956. Diem was expected to enjoy a respite in which he could deal with other internal opposition, and shore up his government. Most estimates then concluded that the principal reason why the communists were unlikely to make an open challenge during that period was the very likelihood that Diem would prove unable to consolidate his power, and that South Vietnam would fall to the communists in the general elections scheduled for 1956, if not as a result of earlier internal turmoil. Thus, a National Intelligence Estimate of 3 August 1954 (NIE 63-5 -54, p. 1) stated: ""We believe that the Communists will not give up their objective of securing control of all Indochina but will, without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by political, psychological, and paramilitary means."

"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese, even with firm support from the U.S . and other powers, may be able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we believe that the chances for this development are poor and, moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the next year…""

In the light of the lessons of the first Indochinese War, the possibility of meeting the longer term challenge from the communists was seen as requiring not only the establishment of an efficient government in South Vietnam (thus circumventing the short-term tendencies toward chaos in the south), but a government under "strong Nationalist leadership," that could enlist the loyalty and active participation of the people in a united struggle against communist forces. This, in turn, at that time, Has seen to depend on swift, firm, French action to back such leadership. But such a change in French policy appeared unlikely. ( Ibid ., p. 6) ""On the basis of the evidence we have at this early date, however, He b elieve that a favorable development of the situation in South Vietnam is unlikely. Unless Mendes-France is able to overcome the force of French traditional interests and emotions Hhich have in the past governed the implementation of policy in Indochina, He do not believe there Hill be the dramatic transfonnat ion in French policy necessary to win the active loyalty and support of the local population for a South Vietnam Government …"" Rh