Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/275

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  IV. A. 5. Tab 4. U.S. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INSURGENCY, 1954-1960 A. U.S. Intelligence; 1954-1959

In electing to support Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 and 1955, and to assume responsibilities from France for providing economic and military assistance to South Vietnam in the years thereafter, the United States deliberately set out to establish in South Vietnam a political environment markedly different from that which Franch had foster ed in the period 1945-54. In 1960; however, there were still similarities to the French period, and these were perhaps more fundamental than were differences.

1. Pre-Geneva, 1950-1954

The pattern that was to confront the U.S. throughout the 1950's was noted in a National Intelligence Estimate of 29 December 1950 (NIE-5), which began: "The French position in Indochina is critically in danger by the Viet Minh, a communist movement that has exploited native nationalism." Under the circumstances prevailing, "there is only a slight chance that the French can maintain their military position long enough to build up an independent Vietnamese government and an effective national army which might win the support of non-communist nationalists, and, in conjunction with French forces, contain the Viet Minh." Despite French efforts to weaken the political, nationa listic base of the Viet Minh by supporting "a semi-autonomous pro-French government under native leadership, . . . concessions to nationalistic sentiment leading to full sovereignty for the Bao Dai government have been forthcoming so slowly and with such seeming reluctance on the part of the French, that the Bao Dai government has not in fact won a strong nationalistic following in any quarter. As a result the French so far have been unable to undermine the political strength of the Viet Minh."

Meamwhile, however, the Estimate noted that military pressure from the Viet Minh, assisted by the Chinese Communists, could eject the French from Tonkin, and ultimately from all of Vietnam ; without a strengthening of the French military position, defeat seemed inevitable, even if the French and the Bao Dai government should begin to transform the political situation. A political mutation was essential to victory, and had to be timely were a military defeat to be averted. The NIE concluded that if Chinese Communist aid Rh