Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/116

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011  2. Victory over the Sects

Diem's forces then ranged out after the other armed factions. Tran Van Saai of the Hoa Hao surrendered, and was given asylum. Another Hoa Hao leader, Ba Cut — who had cut off a finger to remind himself to fight the French, and had sworn not to cut his hair until Vietnam was reunited — was captured while negotiating surrender in return far a commission as lieutenant general in the ARVN. Other leaders were bribed, and the remainder fled or rallied to the GVN. By the end of 1955, Diem appeared to have dealt finally with the challenge of the sects.

It was this apparent success which enabled Diem to survive successfully pressures from an even mare powerful set of opponents: those among his Western allies who were determined to replace him. The dimensions of his victory in Vietnam were just becoming evident when in May, 1955, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization convened. There promptly developed a sharp division of view between the French and the Americans. Bao Dai made known his opposition to Diem, and the French threatened to pull out of Vietnam unless Diem were removed. From Paris, Secretary Dulles reported that the French held that:

""...Time something to be done ta avoid civil war. France warned that armed conflict — first civil war, then guerrilla warfare, then terrorism — would result if we failed ta take action...New Revolutionary Committee...is strongly under Viet Minh influence...There is violent campaign against French and French Expeditionary Corps. Viet Minh agents make good use of it and certain Americans do not seem sufficiently aware of this. French Govt does not wish to have its army act as platform for Viet Minh propaganda. Army will not be maintained in Vietnam at any cost...Continuing with Diem would have three disastrous results:

(1)...Viet Minh victory

(2)...focus hostility of everyone on the French, and

(3)...begin a Franco-U.S. breach...""

The French then proposed to the U.S. that the French Expeditionary Corps be withdrawn, and asked if the U.S. were willing to guarantee French civilians, and the refugees. From Washington, the following instructions to Dulles were returned promptly:

""President's only comment on Vietnam section of (your telegram) was to reiterate position that U.S. could not afford to have forces committed in such undesirable areas as Vietnam. This, of course, is JCS view in past. Am asking Defense and JCS views...""

Asked, the JCS took the position that the question was fundamentally beyond their purview, that neither the ARVN nor the French Expeditionary Corps seemed capable of preserving the integrity of South Vietnam against determined Viet Minh onslaught, and that being debarred from furnishing military forces by the Geneva Agreement, the U.S, was in no position to protect French Rh