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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 78 1955 because of the continued employment of the VNA against the sects and because of the French phaseout, which was veil underway during that year.

The continuing conflict with sect forces, the reduction and eventual withdrawal of the FEC, the lack of a capability to demobilize efficiently, concern about overloading the economy with unemployed veterans (potential grist for the sects' and for the Communists' mill), and the fact that the 88,000-man VNA was viewed as only slightly larger than the sect forces alone led the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense (MOD) to object to the 88,000 force level in 1954. As a first compromise, CHMAAG indicated that the U.S. would agree to supporting a goal of 100,000 by the end of 1955; the same factors led to 0'Daniel's recommendation of a goal of U.S.-supported forces of 150,000 (plus 10,000 sect-troops) by 1 July 1954. Ambassador Reinhardt and CINCPAC fully endorsed 0'Daniel's recommendation, and the JCS recommended approval of this force basis. Upon D0D approval, MAAG immediately began planning for the reorganization of Vietnamese forces "according to American concepts" and at the newly approved level. The organizing and training of this force of 4 field divisions, 6 light divisions, 13 territorial regiments, 1 airborne RCT, and supporting troops, plus an air force and navy of limited size, was to occupy MAAG until the reorganization of 1959.

To accomplish this task, MAAG had a total strength of 342 officers and men, of which 220 were assigned TRIM in February 1955. With the French withdrawing personnel engaged in processing MDAP equipment, MAAG found it difficult to supervise redistribution and end use of this material. As early as February, before the French began to withdraw, 0'Daniel had reported he needed twice the authorized MAAG strength to accomplish this mission; both 0'Daniel and CINCPAC argued against the State Department's interpretation that Article 16 of the Geneva Agreement held MAAG to a ceiling of 342 personnel and the JCS recommended "that the Secretary of Defense inform the National Security Council of the gravity of the situation in Vietnam, requesting the authority to raise the 342 limitation;" and the Secretary of Defense, in forwarding these dissenting views to the Secretary of State, agreed with the dissenter. Before the Secretary of State could reply to the D0D inquiry, an interagency costing team which had just returned from Vietnam reported that because of the reduction in French personnel control of MDAP supplies and spaces had been lost and that as a result, "the capability of supply of forces in the field in the event hostilities should be resumed in mid-1956 would be virtually non-existent."

On February 3, 1956, the Department of State acquiesced in the creation of the Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). By the end of 1956, this group of 350 military personnel had greatly facilitated the recovery and redistribution of MDAP equipment; although they Rh