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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 76  : probably be mobilized without initially curtailing essential economic activities. The Vietnamese Government would be almost entirely dependent upon foreign aid to support such a force.


 * 30. The Diem Government proposes to expand the army to 200,000 by the end of 1954, and to 225,000 by the end of 1955. By the latter date, the army would include 10 divisions plus 60 territorial battalions. The cost of maintaining these forces through 1955 has been estimated at about $450,000,000 of which almost all would have to be furnished by external assistance. The French have supported this proposal as being required.... A proposal for development of a National Guard under the Ministry of the Interior has been postponed pending the outcome of French–Vietnamese–United States discussions.


 * 31. On the other hand, the United States is considering the reduction of the Vietnamese army to about 80,000, including 3 combat light divisions. These reduced forces would have primarily an internal security mission. Against a large-scale Viet Minh invasion, they would serve only as a delaying force. Cost of maintaining the forces at the reduced levels has been tentatively estimated at about $200,000,000 per year. This estimated cost is in addition to financial, economic, and military support funds, which might total $150,000,000 per year.

Thus a listing of problems and deficiencies to be dealt with would contain at least the following: force size; force structure; disengagement of general staff from political affairs; planning of an internal security program; planning of a delaying strategy to counter invasion from the north; correction of a spirit of insubordination and irresponsibility; replacing French cadre; developing a self-reliant officer corps; developing an independent logistics capability; developing adequate technical services; development of training system and program; learning about and coping with the problems of semi-military and police forces; resolving the problem of the National Guard.


 * F.

With the JCS-recommended force levels for Indochina forwarded to Secretary of Defense on 22 November 1954, the upper bound of the regular Vietnamese army force goals was established at 184,000; the taking into account of the objections of Secretary of State, who regarded this force level as "excessive" to the mission of establishing and maintaining internal security, set the lower-bound goal of approximately 88,000. The earliest U.S. actions toward the VNA were devoted to reducing the VNA to this lower level while reorganising the forces in order to rectify as many as possible of the problems listed above. Rh