Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 4.djvu/76

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 74 5. were of two kinds: a tremendous effort to counter an invasion by a large Communist conventional army across a parallel of latitude with a large conventional army composed primarily of U.S. and U.S.-trained "native" troops; and an anti-guerrilla effort so minisculeminuscule [sic] as to be accorded to U.S. forces and less than half a short paragraph in General Matthew B. Ridgway's 291-page book on the Korean war.


 * ...So it seemed a good time [in November 1951] to take care of a persistent annoyance — the existence of large bands of guerrillas in South Korea, particularly in the mountainous areas northwest of Chinju, where they had taken refuge after the Communist retreat. Van Fleet assigned Lieutenant General Paik Sun Yup, with two ROK divisions, to Operation RATKILLER, designed to rid us of this potentially dangerous threat. By the end of January 1952, nearly 20,000 freefooters — bandits and organized guerrillas — had been killed or captured and the irritation was ended for good.

In view of the Korean experience, not yet two years old at the time of O'Daniel's assumption of responsibility and training of the Vietnamese National Army, it is hardly surprising that the mission of defense, however limited, of the 17th parallel was envisioned for these Vietnamese forces to complement the more limited mission of achieving and maintaining internal security. Nor perhaps is it surprising that this mission came to dominate the organization and training of the VNA.


 * E.

While the U.S. was still in the process of taking the decision to assume responsibility for organizing and training the Vietnamese army, NIE-63-7-54 reported on the condition of that army. Related documents give no reason to suspect the accuracy of this estimate or to believe the estimate overstates the magnitude of the tasks the U.S. was about to undertake:


 * 23. The Vietnamese National Army has an estimated strength of 170,000 regulars and 10,000 auxiliaries. Naval and air strength is negligible. The regulars include 5 infantry regiments and 152 combat battalions, of which 69 are infantry, 61 light infantry, 8 guard, 5 airborne infantry, 8 artillery, and one armored reconnaissance. The regroupment necessitated by the Geneva Agreements has forced many units to leave their home provinces for the first time, resulting in a considerable number of desertions since 1 June (up to 25 percent of the total army strength). Some auxiliaries and other semimilitary forces are being demobilized, with the exception of the armed forces of the South Vietnamese sects and certain guard and militia elements.

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