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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 67 these estimated dissidents, no more than some 2,000 were considered "active" by any available official estimate in the period 1954–1960. These forces were consistently estimated to be augmented by political and administrative cadre; their modus operandi was seen as subversion and small-scale guerrilla operation.

Thus the main internal threat to South Vietnam was viewed throughout the period as Hanoi–controlled subversion and small-scale guerrilla operations carried our primarily by military and political cadre of the Viet Minh.

3. "continued evolution" into a regular military force during the last year of the French–Indochina war, and in the period during which the U.S. was deciding to assume responsibility for organizing and training the South Vietnamese army the VPA was judged to be increasing its already formidable capabilities. In April 1955, the regular VPA, "reorganized and strengthened since Geneva," was estimated to have increased in numbers to 240,000 (largely at the expense of the regional forces of 37,000 and the popular forces of 75,000) and to have been organized into 10 infantry divisions, 2 artillery divisions, 1 AAA groupment, and 25 independent infantry regiments. Throughout the period 1954–1960 the VPA grew slowly and was consistently estimated to have the capability of defeating both French and Vietnamese forces were VPA forces to undertake an invasion of South Vietnam. It was generally assumed that these forces would be backed by Communist Chinese forces, if such backing proved necessary.

Just as consistent as the high estimates of VPA capabilities were the estimates of the VPA's intentions: the communists, although continuing to pursue their goal of controlling all of Indochina, would "without violating the armistice to the extent of launching an armed invasion to the south or west, pursue their objective by, , and means." In the fall of 1954 it was reported that "the Viet Minh probably now feels that it can achieve control over all Vietnam without initiating large-scale warfare. Accordingly, we believe that the Communists will exert every effort to accomplish their objectives through means short of war....If, on the other hand, South Vietnam should appear to be gaining in strength or if elections were postponed over Communist objections, the Communists probably would step up their subversive and guerrilla activities in the South and if necessary would infiltrate additional armed forces in an effort to gain control over the area. However, we believe that they would unlikely openly to invade South Vietnam at least prior to July 1954...."

The theme of political, psychological, and paramilitary operations as the communist method of securing its objectives was stressed Rh