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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 65 Paul Ely of 13 December 1954 was approved by the U.S. and, later, by the French governments. The agreement, which provided for full autonomy for Vietnamese forces by 1 July 1955 and for assumption by the US MAAG of full responsibility for assisting the Government of Vietnam in the organizing and training of armed forces (under the general supervision of the French High Commander and with the help of French advisors), led to the assumption of this responsibility by General O'Daniel on 12 February 1955.

The reexamination of the decision, reported by the JCS on 21 January 1955, suggested that "although national policy prescribes making every possible effort to prevent South Vietnam from falling to the communists, the degree to which the United States is willing to support this policy in men, money, materials, and acceptance of additional war risks is not readily apparent," and urged that: "Prior to consideration of military courses of action with respect to this area, a firm decision at national level as to implementation of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia is mandatory." Although no such decision was forthcoming, and even this reexamination of the decision to assist the Vietnamese did not choose one course of action over any other, it did imply by repeated honks on the domino klaxon that U.S. assistance to Vietnam was required. When, a week later, General Collins expressed in more positive terms this need, the way was clear for the NSC to endorse a strong U.S. policy in Vietnam, confirming General O'Daniel's takeover on February 12—but the extent to which the U.S. was prepared to support this policy (then or now) was never made clear.


 * C.

In addition to the more general considerations underlying the U.S. decision to train Vietnamese forces was the specific consideration of the enemy threat to South Vietnam. As perceived during the time this decision was being taken, the threat consisted of three elements: the dissident sect forces in South Vietnam; the communist forces in South Vietnam, dominated by the decisionmakers in Hanoi; and the Vietnamese People's Army of North Vietnam.

1., consisting of an estimated 10,000 Cao Dai, 2,500 Hoa Hao, and 2,600 Bien Xuyen forces, plus the urban police forces which were at that time under the control of the Binh Xuyen, were in opposition to the fledgling Diem government. "The politico-religious armed groups called the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen are anti-communist in orientation, but feudalistic and regressive in all other respects. At present they have an effective veto power over government action. This power they use to block reforms which might threaten their preferred military, economic, and political status. They will Rh