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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011 44 1255 TRIM ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE TRAINING DURING 1955, BECAUSE OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OF THE VNA IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SECTS AND THE LACK OF INTEREST BY THE FRENCH. /JCS HIST.

1255 HOA HAO, BINH XUYEN AND CAO DAI WERE NO LONGER AN ORGANIZED THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT.

120655 THE CNO (AS JCS EXECUTIVE AGENT) REPORTED TRAINING HAD PROGRESSED BUT CRITICAL STAGE HAD BEEN REACHED. STEPS HAD TO BE TAKEN TO RETAIN THE TEMPO OF MAAG.

120855 VNA ARMY, DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, HAD BEEN ABLE TO THWART VIETMINH AND SECTS. LATE 1955 THE VNA GENERAL STAFF BEGAN TO REGROUP THE ARMY INTO DIVISIONS TO TRAIN. ADDITIONAL SECURITY FORCES WERE NEEDED TO FILL THE VOID CREATED BY THE WITHDRAWING ARMY UNITS. /JCS HIST.

121255 THE U.S. CONSULATE IN HANOI WAS CLOSED.

121255 JCS REQUESTED OSD TO ASK NSC TO RECONSIDER ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL FOR VIETNAM.

121355 SEC.DEF., WILSON TO SECRETARY OF STATE, DULLES MEMO DISCUSSING GENEVA AGREEMENT, ARTICLE 16 RELATIVE TO EXPANDED MAAG TO HANDLE MDAP EQUIPMENT. JCS, CINCPAC, DOD FELT THAT ARTICLE 16 AND ITS RESTRICTIVE CLAUSE DID NOT APPLY TO U.S. AND SVN SINCE NEITHER HAD SIGNED.

121355 A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY LT. COL. EVANS MET IN PLANS SECTION, MAAG, TO PLAN THE PREPARATION OF TWO NEW TD'S (TERM) FOR MAAG. THE FIRST PLAN WAS TO ACCOMPLISH PRESENT MISSION AND THE SECOND TO ACCOMPLISH A MISSION TO BEGIN JULY 1, 1956.

121655 ALLEN DULLES WROTE JOHN FOSTER DULLES THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CIA OPERATIONS THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL BE RELAXED SO THAT AGENCY WOULD BE ASSURED OF SUFFICIENT SLOTS UNDER MILITARY COVER TO DO ITS JOB. /335-1.

122055 THE NEW PLANS (TD) BEING DEVELOPED AT MAAG–VIETNAM WERE COMPETED.

122755 LT. COL. HANELIN REPORTED TO CHIEF, MAAG ON WASHINGTON ACTION ON MAAG-VIETNAM PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS.

122755 GENERAL O'DANIEL REPORTED THAT MR. ROBERTSON, DEPT. OF STATE, STATED THAT STATE MIGHT REACT FAVORABLY TO AN INCREASE OVER THE AUTHORIZED 342

EARLY 1956 CONTROVERSY EXISTED BETWEEN FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE OVER ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRIM PROGRAM. IT FUNCTIONED WITH SOME U.S. ADVISORS BUT WAS PREDOMINATELY STAFFED WITH FRENCH INSTRUCTORS. /WID 17–56.

0156 SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY UNITS OCCUPIED TAY NINH, PRINCIPAL CAO DAI POLITICAL CENTER, LEADING TO THE BREAK UP OF THE ORGANIZED CAO DAI ARMED INSURGENCY. AGREEMENT WITH CAO DAI LEADERS ON FEBRUARY 28 LEGALIZED CAO DAI RELIGIOUS PRACTICES AND FORBADE ITS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AS RELIGIOUS SECT. HH